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To evaluate risk factors for human infection with
influenza A subtype H5N1, we performed a matched case-
control study in Vietnam. We enrolled 28 case-patients who
had laboratory-confirmed H5N1 infection during 2004 and
106 age-, sex-, and location-matched control-respondents.
Data were analyzed by matched-pair analysis and multi-
variate conditional logistic regression. Factors that were
independently associated with H5N1 infection were prepar-
ing sick or dead poultry for consumption <7 days before ill-
ness onset (matched odds ratio [OR] 8.99, 95% confidence
interval [CI] 0.98–81.99, p = 0.05), having sick or dead
poultry in the household <7 days before illness onset
(matched OR 4.94, 95% CI 1.21–20.20, p = 0.03), and lack
of an indoor water source (matched OR 6.46, 95% CI
1.20–34.81, p = 0.03). Factors not significantly associated
with infection were raising healthy poultry, preparing
healthy poultry for consumption, and exposure to persons
with an acute respiratory illness.
T
he first indication that the current epizootic of highly
pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5N1 (influenza
A H5N1) would have a serious effect on human heath
occurred in early 2004, when influenza H5N1 was identi-
fied in a series of patients admitted to the National
Pediatric Hospital in Hanoi with severe viral pneumonia
(1). Since then, large-scale and global spread of the disease
in poultry has been accompanied by sporadic cases in
humans. Despite many millions of avian infections and
>200 human cases, knowledge of influenza H5N1 remains
inadequate. Neither how these viruses are transmitted to
humans nor, consequently, the most effective way to
reduce the risk for infection is fully understood.
Descriptive and analytic epidemiologic studies conducted
in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, People’s
Republic of China, during the 1997 outbreak of influenza
H5N1 (2–5) identified visiting a live bird market as a risk
factor. However, the current outbreak encompasses differ-
ent viruses and different sociodemographic, farming, and
behavioral contexts. Several seroprevalence studies of
healthcare workers and a case-control study from Thailand
have been published from the current outbreak (6–9), but
further work is needed to develop and test hypotheses on
the mechanism of transmission of influenza H5N1 to
humans. To clarify the source and mode(s) of transmission
of influenza H5N1 to humans and to guide the control and
prevention of influenza, we conducted a case-control study
of all cases of avian influenza H5N1 identified in humans
in Vietnam in 2004.
Materials and Methods
All persons with laboratory-confirmed influenza A H5
cases detected in Vietnam from January 1 through
December 31, 2004, were eligible for enrollment as case-
patients. Case-patients were identified from persons hospi-
talized with an acute respiratory infection considered by
clinicians, on the basis of clinical and epidemiologic find-
ings, to have a suspected case of H5N1 infection.
Clinicians did not use a systematic case definition or
screening protocol to identify patients eligible for testing
for H5N1 infection. Throat swabs or tracheal aspirate sam-
ples were sent to the National Institute of Hygiene and
Epidemiology in Hanoi or to the Pasteur Institute in Ho
Chi Minh City for reverse transcription (RT) PCR and viral
isolation. When possible, samples with positive results for
influenza A H5 were sent to a World Health Organization
(WHO) reference laboratory for confirmatory diagnosis.
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and †Pasteur Institute, Ho Chi Minh City, VietnamFor each case-patient, 4 control-respondents, individual-
ly matched by gender, age (age difference <24 months), and
place of residence (same ward or village), were selected by
use of a random number table from a list of persons fitting
the selection criteria provided by the community health sta-
tion near each case-patient’s place of residence. Potential
control-respondents were excluded if they reported having
suffered an illness with respiratory symptoms and fever
(temperature  >38°C) during their matched case-patient’s
period of illness (onset to recovery or death). If the select-
ed control-respondent refused to participate or did not meet
the inclusion criteria, the geographically closest eligible
person was then selected from the list. All eligible control-
respondents were asked to provide a throat swab and
venous blood (5 mL) to confirm that they were not current-
ly or had not previously been infected with influenza AH5.
Participation of case-patients and control-respondents was
voluntary and required written consent and, for those aged
<18 years, signature of a parent or guardian.
Trained interviewers administered a structured ques-
tionnaire to case-patients and control-respondents. If the
case-patient or control-respondent was a child or if the
case-patient had died, the questionnaire was administered
to a proxy, usually the child’s parent or a close family
member living in the same household. The questionnaire
collected information about demographic characteristics;
preexisting health status; smoking behavior; potential ani-
mal, human, and environmental exposures to influenza A
H5; and personal and household hygienic practices. Case-
patients or their proxies were asked about exposures in the
7 days before illness onset, and control-respondents were
asked about exposures during the same 7-day period as
their matched case-patient.
Definitions
Persons who met any of the following criteria were
considered to be laboratory-confirmed influenza A H5
case-patients: 1) influenza A H5–specific RNA detected in
a single specimen by RT-PCR by using 2 different primer
pairs; 2) influenza A H5 detected in a single specimen by
RT-PCR identification and by sequencing or virus isola-
tion; 3) influenza AH5–specific RNAdetected by RT-PCR
in 2 different specimen types (e.g., throat swab and tra-
cheal aspirate); and 4) influenza A H5–specific RNA
detected by RT-PCR in 2 samples taken on different days.
Control-respondents were considered to be true control-
respondents if throat swab specimens were negative for
influenza A H5–specific RNA by RT-PCR and anti-H5
antibodies could not be detected in serum samples by
microneutralization assay (10).
Laboratory Methods
Influenza A H5 subtype–specific RNA was detected in
clinical samples by RT-PCR with primers that targeted
regions of the hemagglutinin gene of the influenza H5N1
virus developed by WHO, the US Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Government Virus
Unit in Hong Kong. Clinical specimens were injected into
Madin-Darby canine kidney cells for virus isolation, and
RT-PCR was used to identify influenza A H5. Specimens
and cell cultures suspected of containing influenza A H5
were handled according to recognized biosafety standards.
Serum samples were immediately processed, stored at
−25°C, and shipped frozen on dry ice to CDC. To measure
influenza A H5–specific antibody, microneutralization
assay was conducted as previously described (10) by using
H5N1 viruses A/Vietnam/1194/2004 and A/Vietnam/3212/
2004. Microneutralization test results were considered to
be positive if an anti-H5 titer of >40 was obtained by 2
independent assays.
Statistical Analysis
Data entry and analysis of individual explanatory vari-
ables was performed by using Epi-Info 6 (CDC, Atlanta,
GA, USA). Mantel-Haenszel matched-pair analysis
(McNemar test) was used to estimate the strength and sta-
tistical significance of associations between exposures and
influenza A H5 infection. An association was considered
statistically significant if 2-sided tests of significance had
a p-value <0.05. To examine independence of effects, mul-
tivariate conditional logistic regression was performed by
using the conditional logistical regression (CLogit) func-
tion in Stata/SE 8.0 for Windows (Stata Corp LP, College
Station, TX, USA). Any variables with p≤0.2 after
matched analysis were included in the initial model. A
backward stepwise variable- selection strategy was used to
construct a final model with a significance level of >0.1 for
removal and a significance level of <0.05 for re-entry into
the model. Persons missing data for variables under study
were excluded from any analysis involving the missing
variable. Collinearity was assessed by generating a corre-
lation coefficient matrix for all variables to be considered
for inclusion in the regression model. The presence of
effect-measure modification by age and sex was assessed
for all variables in the final model by entering product
terms. A final model was achieved by entering the vari-
ables retained in the backward selection model.
The attributable risk percent (AR%) was estimated as
follows: ([odds ratio (OR) – 1]/OR) ×100. The population
attributable risk percent (PAR%) was estimated as follows:
PAR% = AR% × proportion of case-patients exposed.
Results
A total of 28 laboratory-confirmed influenza A H5
cases were detected in 2004 from 15 provinces of Vietnam;
21 (75%) were fatal. All 28 cases were RT-PCR positive
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of Hygiene and Epidemiology, Hanoi, or the Pasteur
Institute, Ho Chi Minh City; H5N1 virus was isolated in
12. The diagnosis of influenza A H5 infection was inde-
pendently confirmed for 25: 20 at a WHO reference labo-
ratory and 5 at the Oxford University Clinical Research
Unit in Vietnam.
The interviews began on February 7, 2004, at which
time 20 of the 28 case-patients had already been identified.
The interval between onset of illness and interview was a
mean of 35.7 days; the maximum interval was 63 days.
The mean age of case-patients was 14 years (range 1–31
years, median 15 years), and 9 (32%) patients were chil-
dren <10 years of age. The numbers of male and female
case-patients were equal (14 each). Among confirmed
case-patients were 2 family clusters (mother and daughter
and 2 sisters). A total of 106 control-respondents were
enrolled, 4 per case-patient, except for 3 case-patients aged
<5 years for whom only 1, 2, and 3 control-respondents
could be recruited per case, respectively. All control-
respondents were negative for avian influenza A H5–spe-
cific RNA by RT-PCR and for anti-H5 antibodies by
microneutralization assay. None of the case-patients or
control-respondents worked in the commercial (industrial)
poultry-raising sector.
The results of matched-pair analysis are shown in
Table 1. Direct handling of sick or dead poultry in the 7
days before onset of illness had the strongest point esti-
mate of effect (matched OR 31) and high statistical signif-
icance (p<0.001) despite wide confidence limits (95%
confidence interval [CI] 3.4–1150). The presence of sick or
dying poultry in the household (matched OR 7.4, 95% CI
2.7–59) or neighborhood (matched OR 3.9, 95% CI
1.0–55.7) was also statistically associated with infection as
was the absence of an indoor water source in the household
(matched OR 5.0, 95% CI 1.3–77.0) and education to high
school level or higher (matched OR 16.0, 95% CI
1.2–594.1).
Eight variables with p≤0.2 were considered for inclu-
sion in the conditional logistic regression model to esti-
mate independence of effects. Although significantly
associated with infection in the single-variable analysis,
the presence of sick or dead poultry in the neighborhood
was excluded from the final regression model because
missing data for this variable led to the exclusion of 36
participants (6 case-patients and 30 control-respondents).
Educational level was excluded because it was not a rele-
vant variable for the 13 case-patients <15 years of age.
Because of the 2 family clusters, each comprising 2 case-
patients, the influence of clustering of household-level fac-
tors on the regression model was investigated by running
the regression model first with all cases and then again
including only 1 case from each of these 2 households. All
4 variations of 1 case from each household were run.
Because the outcomes of these different approaches did
not differ, all cases were included in the final model.
The final conditional logistic regression model includ-
ed 3 variables as independent risk factors for H5N1 infec-
tion (Table 2). Of the 28 case-patients, 16 (57%) had either
sick or dead poultry in their household or had directly pre-
pared sick or dead poultry for consumption; another 6
reported sick or dead poultry in the neighborhood. Of the
28 case-patients, 22 (79%) did not have an indoor water
source. No statistically significant effect-measure modifi-
cation was detected.
Among persons who prepared sick or dead poultry for
consumption, the proportion of H5N1 cases attributable to
this practice (AR%) is estimated in this study to be 89%
([(8.99 – 1)/8.99] × 100). However, because only 32% of
all case-patients reported this practice, stopping this prac-
tice would prevent only an estimated 28% of H5N1 cases
(PAR% = 0.89 × 0.32).
Discussion
Source of Infection
This study identified the presence in the household and
the handling of dead or sick poultry in an H5N1-affected
area as risk factors for human H5N1 infection. Although
not surprising, these findings reinforce the hypothesis that
close contact with infected domestic poultry is the primary
source of transmission of influenza H5N1 to humans. The
absence of a statistical association between infection and
contact with other animals such as pigs, cats, or dogs is
reassuring. Replication and excretion of H5N1 by asymp-
tomatic domestic waterfowl has been demonstrated and is
a plausible source of infection for humans (11); however,
although a 1997 case-control study found that visiting live
poultry markets was a risk factor for human influenza A
H5N1 infection (2), our study and the study from Thailand
(9) did not identify contact with healthy poultry as a risk
factor. However, viral titers in asymptomatic waterfowl
may be much lower than in diseased poultry (11) and may
therefore pose a low risk to humans, which our study was
underpowered to identify.
Despite evidence that limited human-to-human trans-
mission of H5N1 has occurred (3,5,12), we observed no
significant differences between case-patients and control-
respondents in terms of exposure to persons who might be
a source of H5N1 infection, e.g., patients with an acute res-
piratory infection. This finding is consistent with that of
the case-control study in Thailand (9).
Route of Transmission
Our study found an association between infection and
direct and household contact with diseased poultry. This
Human Avian Influenza A H5N1, Vietnam
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transmission may be by inhalation or conjunctival deposi-
tion of large infectious droplets, which may travel only
short distances (13); second, the presence of infected poul-
try in the home and preparation of infected poultry for con-
sumption may result in exposure to higher virus
concentrations than other types of exposure. An alternative
hypothesis is that the consumption, rather than the prepa-
ration, of infected poultry is the route of infection.
Domestic cats and possibly tigers have been infected by
the oral route (14,15), and the observed association
between preparation and infection could be the result of a
confounding association between preparing an infected
bird (apparent risk factor) and consuming an infected bird
(true risk factor). Unfortunately, the study did not ask
about consumption of sick or dead poultry because the gas-
trointestinal route of transmission was not considered
plausible at the time the study was designed.
The unexpected finding that the absence of an indoor
water source is associated with infection may point toward
a role for self-inoculation into conjunctival, nasal, or oral
mucosa by contaminated hands or possibly foodstuffs.
Certainly, the environmental stability of avian influenza
viruses is sufficient for this to occur (16), and hand-
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infections (17). However, we asked 2 questions specifical-
ly about handwashing behavior, and neither was signifi-
cantly associated with infection (Table 1). An alternative,
and more controversial, explanation is that people without
access to an indoor water source may acquire infection by
drinking or washing in outdoor water sources contaminat-
ed with feces from infected poultry. This hypothesis is
plausible, given the extended survival of avian influenza
viruses in water (18,19) and the demonstration of oral
infectivity in cats (14).  Although an indoor water source
might simply be a proxy indicator of socioeconomic status
or the priority the household gives to hygiene, all other
hygiene factors and a composite hygiene index did not
show a statistically significant association with infection.
That 5 case-patients did not report any exposure to sick
poultry in the 7 days before illness onset has several possi-
ble explanations: recall bias by case-patients or their prox-
ies, infection acquired from infected but asymptomatic
animals such as ducks, an incubation period >7 days, or
infection from a contaminated environment as discussed
above.
Study Limitations
A major source of potential bias in this and other stud-
ies of risk factors for human H5N1 infection is the use of
self-reported prior exposure to sick poultry as a screening
tool for identifying potential case-patients. Use of this tool
introduces a selection bias that favors finding greater expo-
sure to sick poultry among case-patients than other groups,
regardless whether the relationship is causal. In our study,
clinicians were not using a systematic screening tool to
identify possible H5N1 case-patients, but knowledge of
poultry as the source of human H5N1 infection was ubiq-
uitous. Possibly, H5N1 case-patients who did not have
exposure to sick poultry may have been less likely to be
identified than case-patients who did report this exposure.
However, 5 of the 28 case-patients (18%) did not report
exposure to sick poultry, indicating that exposure to sick
poultry was not a prerequisite for identification as a case-
patient. In light of this conflict between clinical necessity
and study purity, estimates of the size of the association
between exposure to sick poultry and H5N1 infection
could be interpreted as maximums that are likely to have
been inflated by this selection bias.
The relatively small number of case-patients means that
the study may be underpowered to detect factors posing
only a moderate risk for infection and to detect effect mod-
ification. A standardized questionnaire and trained inter-
viewing staff were used to try to minimize interviewer
bias, but masking the interviewers as to the case or control
status of the respondents was not possible. Recall bias was
likely to have occurred, especially because the high case-
fatality rate meant that a larger proportion of interviews in
the case group (26/28) than the control group (35/106)
were completed by proxies. The substantial delay between
onset of illness and interviews (mean 35.7 days) is also a
potential source of recall bias.
The finding of a significant positive association
between level of education and risk for infection was unex-
pected and is difficult to explain. It may be the conse-
quence of a bias introduced by proxy respondents for
deceased case-patients reporting higher levels of education
than case-patients had actually achieved. 
Misclassification of case-patients and control-respon-
dents was unlikely. All control-respondents were demon-
strated to have no detectable antibodies to H5N1, and all
case-patients had a clinically compatible illness with labo-
ratory evidence of H5N1 infection, which was independ-
ently verified for 25 (89%) of the 28 cases.
Public Health and Research Implications
Preparing sick or dead poultry for consumption in an
H5N1-affected area is a risky practice. Although this study
cannot estimate the absolute risk, among those who pre-
pared sick or dead poultry for consumption, a high propor-
tion of infections could be attributed to this practice.
However, as the practice was not that widespread in our
study participants, stopping it would prevent only an esti-
mated 28% of H5N1 cases. Less risky but more wide-
spread practices probably account for a greater proportion
of H5N1 cases; these practices must also be identified and
tackled. Regardless whether consumption of infected poul-
try is itself a risk factor, preparation and consumption of
sick or dead poultry in infected areas must stop. That all
106 persons selected as control-respondents from commu-
nities with at least 1 confirmed human H5N1 case were
negative for H5N1 antibodies adds further evidence to the
belief that widespread subclinical H5N1 infection has not
yet occurred in Southeast Asia (20).
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an indoor water source and H5N1 infection provides an
interesting basis for formulating new hypotheses, but it is
not sufficiently strong evidence for concluding that H5N1
transmission is occurring by water or as a result of inade-
quate hygiene. Despite 2 reports of exposure to potentially
contaminated water in Vietnamese H5N1 case-patients
([21]; pers. comm., Ministry of Health, Vietnam), no
human cases of H5N1 infection have been directly attrib-
uted to exposure to contaminated water. Nevertheless,
hygiene practices and access to safe water have collateral
benefits regardless of H5N1 and should be encouraged and
pursued. Environmental investigations are needed to sam-
ple water sources in and around the households of incident
H5N1 case-patients and compare the findings to water
sources sampled in and around unaffected households.
Familial clusters of cases have been a significant fea-
ture of the epidemiology of H5N1 infection since 2004 in
that numerous clusters have occurred in Vietnam,
Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Turkey (22,23).
Although common exposures and behavior may be one
explanation for the marked clustering, most clusters have
involved blood relatives such as sibling pairs or parent-
child groups rather than unrelated pairs such as husbands
and wives. This finding suggests that inherited biologic
factors, such as sialic acid receptor phenotype or immune
response, may be determinants of infection and disease.
Studying intrinsic determinants of susceptibility will
require pooling of data and samples from affected families
across affected countries. If intrinsic susceptibility were a
risk determinant across affected countries, it might dilute
associations between certain behavior and infection unless
the analyses were undertaken within subgroups that are
homogeneous with respect to their intrinsic susceptibility.
In this respect, intrafamilial studies that combine measures
of biologic susceptibility with data about behavioral pat-
terns, including food consumption and hygiene practices,
may be particularly enlightening.
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